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ABSTRACT
The task of this paper is to synthesize certain of the published
research findings in health economics pertaining to hospitals. In
particular the theme of the survey centers around the use of concepts
of market efficiency common to economists in the field of industrial
organization to explain performance of hospital markets. A
substantial amount of research has been conducted in recent years
related to various aspects of performance of producers and consumers
of health care services. These studies have taken a number of
directions. Recent actions by regulators and third party payers that
provide more incentive for efficient health care delivery systems
have generated interest in the nature, causes, and remedies of market
failure in this industry. Therefore, the thrust of this paper places
emphasis on the delivery of health care services emphasizing hopsital
services, within a market context and attempts to analyze the
existence and extent of market failure within health care markets.
The general conclusions of the paper are that the cost structure of
hospitals does not warrant there being monopoly producers of hospital
services. Therefore, market failure is the result of externalities
in the form of moral hazard, most of which is generated through the
organization and operation of risk shifting to third party payers.
Additional market failure is generated by a variety of attempts by
governments to regulate the health care sector. The paper concludes
with a discussion of changes that are taking place in the risk
sharing formulas that define the methods through which health care
services are purchased, the effects these changes are having on
market efficiency, and, finally, with a description of empty boxes
for which future research is needed.

I INTRODUCTION
The hospital industry is a large and complex segment of the economy
of the United States The more than 6500 acute-care hospitals vary
widely in site and services provided, generating significant interest in
the efficiency of the industry However, an analysis of the industry
from the perspective of an efficient industry structure has been
generally lacking Various forms of regulation and the behavior of
third party payers are alleged to have reduced or eliminated the
incentives for efficient markets, resulting in an industry that is
inefficiently organised Recent actions by regulators and third party
payer; that provide more incentive for efficient health care delivery
systems has generated interest in the nature, causes and remedies of
market failure in this industry
The overriding task of this paper will be to synthesize certain of
the published research findings in health economics pertaining to
hospitals In particular, the theme of the survey will center around
concepts of market efficiency used by economists in the field of
industrial organization An immediate problem confronted by the authors
in carrying out this task is that of coming to an acceptable definition
of the field of industrial organization Bain, if not the founder,
certainly popularized the field, states that industrial organization
deals with the organization and working of markets (Bain, 1968, p 1)
Scherer states that industrial organization ". is concerned with how
productive activities are brought into harmony with society's demands
for goods and services through some ongoing mechanism such as a free
market, and how variations and imperfections in the organizing mechanism
affect the degree of success achieved by producer; in satisfying
society's wants" (Scherer, 1980, p. I) Stigler, on the other hand,
states that "there is no such subject as industrial organization The
courses taught under this heading have for their purpose the
understanding of the structure and behavior of indus t r i es . . o f an
economy [and deal] precisely with the content of [micro] economic
theory (Stigler, 1968, p 1) Clearly, these definitions are very
broad, encompassing most of mi cr oec onom i c theory (including welfare
economics^, those aspects of macr oec onomi c theory that pertain to the
manner in which macr oec onomi c activities feed back to influence market
and firm performance, and some aspects of marketing.
Traditionally, economists in industrial organization have compared
various market outcomes against those that would hold under a
competitively structured market The competitive market is used as the
nori because it generates an equilibrium which maximizes various
criteria of economic welfare. Deviations from the structural
characteristics of competitive market; were used to predict deviation;
from competitive performance, the latter being considered a; deviations
from welfare optimization (Bain, 1 v -i 3
, p 3). Stigler, and tc seme
estent Scherer stres; the weaknesses in placing too much reliability en
market structure as a predictor of economic performance Instead, those
authors hold that one should place greater reliance en market behavici
or conduct, the latter being generally defined to include policies
pertinent to price and product determination
More recently i body of literature drawn together by Baumol,
Panzer, and Willig (B-P-V) has introduced a new approach to evaluate
market performance The thrust of this approach to analyzing markets is
to divorce itselt from the structural norms of the competitive model
that pertain to numbers and size distribution of firms in an industry by
placing increased emphasis on entry conditions as predictors of market
performance Using stronger criteria for free entry than did Bain or
Stigler, they introduce the concept of a perfectly contestable market,
defined as a market in which entry is free, potential entrants have
access to the same market demands and production technology as the
incumbent firms, and potential entrants evaluate the desirability of
entry on incumbents' pre-entry prices (Baumol, Panzer, and Willig,
1982, pp 4-8). This approach heavily rests on the cost structures of
single- and mu I t i -pr oduct firms.
Clearly, these definitions and approaches leave the field too
broadly defined to be treated in one paper, even as it may apply to a
single industry. Therefore, an attempt is made here to use elements
from both the traditional and the B-P-W approaches to synthesize
research on the efficiency of hospital markets. The structure of
hospital markets will be described in the next section. After
considering current hospital market structures, possible causes of the
structural patterns are examined. Most prominently, cost functions of
hospitals are discussed to determine whether existing market structures
conform to or deviate from those predicted by the cost functions
However, a significant caveat must be made. Most research in which
structural information has been reported was not oriented to analyses of
market behavior. Therefore, structural information on hospital markets
relates to geographic or political areas that may or may not correctly
delineate economic markets. Section III will examine the issue of market
failure, that is, the possibility of some characteristic of the industry
that prevents the market from arriving at an efficient outcome Section
IV examines attempts tc use regulation to correct market failure The
final section discusses attempts tc provide more market incentives for
greater economic efficiency. In this section, we discuss some of the
ways in which both the public and private sectors are responding tc
these changes.
The overriding theme ot the work reviewed in this paper points to
the argument that the regulatory environment in which hospitals operate
and the nature ct third party payment systems have provided very limited
incentives for erticient production and consumption of health care
resources This appears mere true tor earlier time periods, with more
recent years witnessing some evolution. Changes in the regulatory
environment are necessary to generate incentives for changes both in
market structure, and producer and consumer behavior. Policies that
shift increasing amounts of financial risk from the third party payers
to the consumers and producers should continue to bring increased
efficiency to hospital markets The signiticance of this is that the
underlying problem does not appear to be inherent in the structure of
the markets There is little evidence of economies of scale that would
necessitate monopoly market structures Rather, the underlying problems
may actual 1 y be found in the nature ct regulatory and reimbursement
policies
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Description of Hospital Structures
Hospitals account for the largest segment of health care
expenditures In 1 v 8 3 , $14 7.2 billion went to short-term acute care
hospitals; this amounted to 43 9 percent of the $335 4 billion spent in
the US on health care (Health Care Financing Review 1935). The
hospitals are configured in a variety of sizes, shapes, and owneiship
tons . The American Hospital Association places under the rubric of
community hospitals all non-federal, short-term general and other
special hospitals whose facilities and services are available to the
public In 1 V 9 3 , 5,'/ 8 3 of the 4,888 hospitals in the United States were
classified as community hospitals The remaining hospitals consist
federal hospitals, long term care hospitals, hospital units o t
institutions, psychiatric hospitals, hospitals tor tuberculosis and
other respiratorv diseases, chronic disease hospitals, institutions
the mentally retarded, and alcoholism and chemical dependency hospitals
The community hospital category consists of 3,347 not-for-profit
institutions (the bulk of which are affiliated with religious
organizations) 757 proprietary hospitals, and 1,679 hospitals owned by
state and Iccai governments. As show in Fable 1, the number of
hospitals, both community and in total has decreased between 1^75 and
1 Q 83 There has been a decline in the number of hospitals in all
categories in the last decade with the encepticn of proprietary
hospitals The number of proprietary hospitals declined during the
early years ct the decade, but has shown increases since 1983.
o t
for
Hospitals ilso show considerable variation in size, a variable
usually measured in terras of bed capacity It is shown in Table 2 that
the average number of beds in a co mm unity hospital has been increasing
since 1975, the bed
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cent of the total number of hospitals, yet represent
total bed capacity and handle just 13 percent of
In fact, there are approximately 2 25 co mmunity
r tewer beds and 1200 with 50 or tewer beds The
this skewed distribution are unclear. These numbers
ates and provide very little guidance as to market
, it appears that a relatively few hospitals dominate
A recent development in hospital structure has been the emergence
of nu 1 1 i -hosp i t a 1 systems Ermann and Cabel (1964; report that the
number of mu 1 1 i -hcsp i t a 1 systems has grown from 202 in 1975 to 256 in
19 8 2, or at an average annual rate of 3.4 percent The percent of
short-term acute care hospitals in the US. belonging to mu 1 1 i -hosp 1 t a 1
systems grew to 33 percent in 1982 from 25 percent in 1978 The average
system consisted of 7 5 hospitals and over 1400 beds Again, a pattern
of skewed distribution arises The 34 of these systems thai ne
investor owned are much larger than the not-for-profit systems, the
former having an average of 23 hospitals and 3100 beds per system.
It is important to consider the economic motive for
these mu 1 1 i -hosp i t a 1 systems Their primary potential a
better access tc capital, economies of scale, system div
access to personnel and management, and system planning
organixation Contract management, another growing phen
hospitals, may provide many of these benefits without ac
a full merger of the hospitals. However, contract manag
likely to provide improved access to capital markets. S
increasingly necessary tor hospitals in order to main tai
facilities and participate in integration into other are
care sector. For example, 55.1 percent of the multi-sys
ambulatory care facilities. 50 percent own nursing homes
HMO's, 72 perc"ent own physician office buildings, and 4
health care management consulting businesses (Ermann and
55) Comparable data are not available for hospitals no
systems However, it is generally believed that single
hospitals are participating in the movement toward integ
causes of which will be discussed more fully in a later
paper
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The varying mixes ct services offered by short-term acute care
hospitals truly makes them mu 1
t
i - pr oduc t t i rms . The American Hospital
Association identifies 44 unique services The Health Car? Financing
Administration (HCFA) divides the outputs ot hospitals into 467
diagnostic related group? (DRi) fcr purposes of classifying hospital
outputs provided to recipients ot Medicare Therefore, it is difficult
tc categorise and. thus, measure the outputs of hospitals. However is
an example of the disparity of services orfered by different hospitals,
consider the tact that while all short-terra acute care hospitals provide
basic nursing services and emergency services, only 105 percent of all
hospitals in the J.S maintain open heart surgery facilities Thirty-
tour percent operate CT scanners, 15.8 percent provide cardiac
catheteriration, 662 percent operate blood banks, 16.0 percent provide
radiation x-ray therapy, and only 3.8 percent of all hospitals provide
organ transplants
Larger hospitals generally offer a larger spectrum of services,
including more tertiary care services The widest range ot services is
usuilly offered by university hospitals and regional tertiary care
facilities, e g . the hospitals used by physicians from the Mayc clinic.
This seems to be changing Joskow points out that the range of medical
services available in smaller hospitals has increased in the last decade
in response to competition tor the increased flow ct medical specialists
into health care markets (Joskow, 1 V 9 1
)
B. Hospital Market Structure
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After considering all ot the complexities of determining the
relevant market, it is necessary to draw some practical conclusions If
viewed from the perspective of the ho sp i t a 1 - pa t i en t market (as we hava
been discussing), hospital markets tor most services probably encompass
single standard metropolitan statistical areas. They also include
communities with no nearer SMSA ' s even though some of the latter of
which also contain hospitals (Lyr. k 1984) For the more exotic services
offered by tertiary care centers, the market may encompass multiple
metropolitan areas as well as lower populated regions around these
areas Therefore, patients within most communities having a single
hospital are within reasonable proximity, as exhibited by patient origin
analysis, to other alternative hospitals This holds even for people in
more sparsely populated sections of the country In tact, Farley
reported that only 265 of the 6000 community hospitals in the U S meet
the criteria for classjtication is sole co mm unit hospitals set forth by
the TaK Equity and Fiscal Re sp ons 1 b i 1 1 t v Act of 1982 (TEFRA) and the
Social Security Amendments of 1 « ?3 (Farley, 1985). However, by the
strict Elzinga and Hogarty LIFO and LOFI tests, some of the hospitals
would not qualify as having monopolies
This general description of the problems of delineating the
boundaries of market in which hospitals compete provides a caveat to the
structural information available That information, generally available
on the basis of hospital bed concentration within SMSA ' s , will tend to
understate the true boundaries of the market and, therefore, overstate
the levels of market concentration
ratio for 2 11 SMSA 's is 584
this value Large metropolitan areas tend to have very low two-firm
concentration ratios
Chicago,
the other estieme, smaller metropolitan areas have high two-firm
concentration ratios That ratio is 75 percent for Pensacola, Florida,
72 percent for Topeka, Kansas, and 73 percent for Sioux Falls, South
Dakota
4 The average two-firm concentration
There is a large amount of variation is
5 For example, that ratio is 8 percent for
percent for New York, and 10 percent for San Francisco At
Certain tentative conclusions can be drawn from this structural
information First, there are very few, if any, hospitals that operate
in monopoly markets. Second, hospitals in large metropolitan markets
approach an atomistic structure with a large number of hospitals with
very small market shares. Third, smaller metropolitan areas tend to be
somewhat more concentrated, approaching oligopolistic structure.
However, hospitals in these areas usually compete with regional tertiary
care centers in larger metropolitan areas. In general, these conditions
indicate that hospital markets should have no structural reason to
exhibit an t
i
-compe t i
t
i ve outcomes
C The Cost Structure of Hospitals
The structure of hospital markets provides some evidence of the
nature and extent of competitive performance that could exist in those
markets Before moving on, it is important to examine various possible
causes of market structure The nature of the cost structure of the
firms often dictates how an efficient market is structured and,
therefore, the outcome of other performance dimensions.
Estimates of the cost functions of hospitals have been thoroughly
reviewed elsewhere (Feldstein, 1974, Jacobs, 1974, Berki, 19^2, Hefty,
1969, Cowing, et al, 1983a) Therefore, only general conclusions will
be drawn from these studies Early cost studies concentrated on
estimating the degree of economies of scale associated with hospitals
These investigations used very aggregate indices of hospital output,
e g , admissions, bed capacity, bed capacity adjusted for occupancy
rates, and bed days of services provided These early cost studies
found evidence of significant economies of scale, usually up to a
hospital sire of approximately 500 beds (Cowing, et al, 1983a)
Feldstein (1974) concluded that there are neither significant economies
or diseconomies of scale In fact, refinements of these early studies
indicate some economies of scale up to a relatively small size, usually
considered to be in the vicinity of 100-150 beds These studies have
been criticired for improper treatment of long run and short run
effects. However, Feldstein's (1974) second major conclusion is that
the short run marginal cost of additional patient care is much lower
than average cost.
The studies have also been criticised for failure to account for
product mix and quality. Although quality remains largely untreated,
recent cost studies have used various methods to account for differences
in product miK Differences in service miR may result in economies of
scope, i.e , cost advantages to mu 1 1
i
-pr oduc t firms De f i ni t i ona 1 1 y ,
economies of scope occur when the product mix is such that the resource
cost of producing the bundle of products jointly are less than the sum
of the resource costs of producing them separately (B-P-W, 1930) A
scaler index developed from a variety of weighting systems has been used
in most studies that account for case mix (Pauly, 1978; Rafferty, 1971;
Lave, Lave, and Silverman, 1972; Feldstein and Schuttinga, 1977; Luke,
1979). The consensus of these studies is that case -mix effects explain
between one-half and two-thirds of the cost variation among hospitals
6
Cowing and Holtman (1983b) used a translog functional form to estimate
the short run cost function of hospitals. This method assumes no
specific functional form for the cost function and so uses the flexible
form, the translog. It has an advantage in that it provides for a
direct measurement of any degree of economies of scope that may result
from the mu 1 t i -ser v i ce outputs of hospitals Cowing, et al found only
limited evidence of economies of scope. They included the stock of
capital in their model to capture long run equilibrium effects. The
empirical results lead to the conclusion that hospitals have too much
capital. However, there are two significant weaknesses in this
research First, the translog estimation process requires a very large
sample size to be efficient. Cowing, et al could divide all hospital
outputs into only five very broad categories, each of which contain very
diverse procedures ranging from those that are common and simple to very
sophisticated procedures Generally, only larger hospitals offer the
more sophisticated procedures Therefore, the results of such an
estimation may not reveal much of the true behavior of the mu 1 t i -pr oduc
t
cost functions Second, they provide only a limited ability to estimate
long run conditions, the results of which do no relate directly to the
product mix of the hospital.
Many gaps remain in the knowledge this literature has generated
concerning hospital cost structures. New econometric techniques have
been developed to deal with the mu 1 1 -ser v i ce nature of hospitals
Also, data bases are being generated that provide hospital output
categorized into 467 diagnostic related groups The sample sizes of
these data are becoming large enough to meet the needs of the new
econometric estimation techniques Therefore, new research findings
should be forthcoming in this area that answer important questions. The
more obvious examples include estimates of appropriate configurations of
hospitals, the effects of hospital mergers, the effects on efficiency of
specialized service centers (e g , outpatient surgery centers and ob-gyn
centers), the differences in capital costs between not-for-profit and
proprietary hospitals and the effects of these differences on case mix,
to aention a few However, the evidence of only limited economies of
scale suggests that hospital markets, except for those that are very
small, need not be monopo 1 i s t i ca 1 1 y structured
I II HOSPITAL MARKET BEHAVIOR AND MARKET FAILURE
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In this section we will discuss some possible causes of market
failure. Ue do so by examining the environment in which hospitals
operate We will concentrate on the impact on hospital behavior of the
relationship between third party payers, physicians and hospitals and
the broader regulatory environment in which they operate.
A General Behavior of Hospitals
Hospitals do not necessarily follow the single objective of profit
maximization generally attributed to most firms in the economy. There
are a number of reasons for this. As stated earlier in this paper, a
large number of hospitals are not-for-profit In fact, many markets are
serviced solely by not-for-profit hospitals. Therefore, due to this
phenomenon, and other market imperfections discussed later in this
paper, it is possible for hospitals to operate according to objective
functions that contain criteria other than profit maximization
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Lee argues that hospital administrators attempt to maximize their
status relative to competitors This is achieved through defensive
actions whereby the objective is to minimize the difference between the
actual and desired inputs of the hospital subject to a breakeven
condition Therefore, hospitals may increase expenditures on inputs
without increasing output or revenues due to the defensive nature of the
hosp l ta 1 ( Lee
,
1971)
All of the models described to this point depict the hospital as
being controlled by hospital administrators with the objective of
maximizing output. Pauly and Redisch change the assumption of
administrator control by assuming that hospitals are controlled de facto
by their medical staffs These staffs are assumed to have the objective
of maximizing their joint incomes Equilibrium is achieved in the
10
market due to an assumption that there is an optimal number of
physicians on the medical staff of each hospital vhen the number of
physicians eiceeds the optimal level, new hospitals will be formed In
such a model, an equilibrium in the number of hospitals is achieved when
the supply price has been bid up to the point where marginal and average
physicians' incomes and the marginal supply price all are equated (Pauly
and Redisch, 1973, Pauly, 1974, Pauly, 1980)
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In summary, the behavior of hospitals has not focused on price
competition, the usual element that enforces efficiency in competitive
markets Even though price competition was an element in many of the
models described, quality competition predominated. The result has been
outcomes characterized by excessive quality and capital expenditures,
and unnecessary duplication of services Therefore, it is necessary to
1 1
direct our attention to why competition does not enforce efficiency,
i.e., to other causes of market failure.
B Risk Sharing Mechanisms as a Cause of Market Failure
In 1980, over 90 percent of the expenditures for hospital services
were paid by public and private insurers Appr oh ima t e 1 y two-thirds of
the expenditures for all types of health services are paid by the third
parties (Health Care Financing Review, 1981) The existence of
insurance in hospital markets is not the problem Insurance, by
reducing the financial risk to patients and providers, greatly increases
economic welfare (Arrow, 1963). Market failure has occurred as a result
of the characteristics health insurance has taken in the US
Private insurers were the first to emerge on a broad basis Blue
Cross plans emerged during the depression years to cover hospital costs,
along with Blue Shield plans to cover physician costs. These plans
still account for almost 50 percent of the private health insurance
written nationwide. The plans have certain characteristics that relate
to issues of market failure. The Blue Cross plans, as part of their
enabling legislation, were to operate as not-for-profit insurers in
return for favorable tax treatment in many states (Reed, 194 7 ; Freeh,
1974). From the perspective of the insurance markets, lower costs
derived from the tax advantages permitted Blue Cross to obtain a
dominant position in many insurance markets (Freeh, 1979). The not-for-
profit status of the plans, when coupled with the tax advantages, led to
a surplus which could not be distributed as dividends The actual
distribution of this surplus has resulted in a property rights struggle
among the providers, plan administrators, and the insureds If some of
the benefits from the tax advantages were passed on to consumers in
forms such as lower premiums for equal coverage or greater coverage for
the same premium cost as offered by the for-profit commercials, the
latter would be substantially impeded from competing effectively, which
does not appear to be the case.^ There remains competition between
plan administrators and providers for any remaining rents that result
from the tax advantages. Substantial evidence has been found that
supports the hypothesis that these groups share the rents
Administrative slack and greater insurance loading charges (Freeh and
Ginsberg, 1978, Freeh, 1976, Vogel, 1977, Eisenstadt and Kennedy, 1?81)
and higher provider charges were found to be related to the levels of
the pa tax advantages (Arnould and Eisenstadt, 1991; Arnould and
DeBrcck, l<>84a and 1985, Sloan, 1980)
More critical to hospital markets is the tax treatment of health
insurance premiums paid by individuals or for individuals by their
employers Along these lines, it is also important to consider the
methods by which hospitals are reimbursed by the insurers Insurance
coverage has both a substitution and an income effect Insurance
effectively reduces the marginal cost of health care by an amount
proportional to the level of coverage Therefore, all other things
equal, consumers demand more units of health care. The transfer of
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income from the "wellness" state of nature to the "sickness" state
generates an income effect by reducing income in the former state by the
amount of the premiums Medicare and Medicaid, publicly funded health
care insurance for the elderly and poor, respectively, have generated
similar increases in demand for health care services
TaH treatment of insurance premiums in the U 5 has eliminated most
of the income effect (Gensheimer, 1985) Premiums paid by individuals
and corporations are treated as a deductible expense. For many
individuals, the premiums are a part of an employee benefit package that
is not considered a part of taxable income Therefore, the impact of
any increase in premiums in a coverage period, regardless of consumption
of health care in the previous period, is greatly diminished The
result is a significant amount of moral hazard in the form of both
excessive insurance coverage and excessive consumption of health care
services Financial risks are shifted from the consumer of health care
services to the third party insurers (Feldstein, 19 7 4, Arrow, 1963;
Zeckhauser , 1970)
Traditional reimbursement mechanisms developed by public and
private insurers permitted similar shifting of risk from providers to
the third party payers Providers were (and in many cases still are)
paid for health care on a retrospective f ee-f o
r
-se r v i ce basis with fees
set by a variety of cost-plus pricing mechanisms This system has the
obvious problem of generating more revenues to providers if more
services are provided, which can be done without increasing the
financial risk to the provider Therefore, providers had an incentive
to expand output, generating additional moral hazard.
The problem of moral hazard is further complicated by two
information problems First, consumer knowledge of health care
production is generally limited and costly to obtain. The primary care
physician generally fulfills two roles for the patient: diagnosis and
production The physician functions as an agent for the patient
prescribing the treatment necessary and then supplying the patient with
his own and other health care inputs (Evans, 1933). However, because
insurance greatly reduces the marginal cost of health care services, the
second problem eme
r
ges--ne i
t
her the consumer nor the primary care
physician have an incentive to search for low cost providers (Feldstein,
1974 , Freeh, 1984)
Attempts to document cost and expenditure increases attributable to
moral hazard are numerous (Feldstein, 1973). Pauly (1969) estimated the
welfare cost in 1963 to be $450 million Feldstein (1973), adding to
Pauly's analysis insurance induced price and quality changes, estimated
the welfare costs for 1969 at about $2.4 billion. This represents
approximately 20 percent of total hospital expenditures
More recently, the Rand group, in a controlled experiment, found
that 25 and 50 percent copayraents reduced average total ambulatory and
hospital expenditures by 19 and 30 percent, respectively (Newhouse,
1978, Phelps, 1982, Phelps and Newhouse, 1972) Phelps (1982) further
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estimates that tasing half of private insurance premiums would reduce
health care expenditures by $12 to 513 billion, over 57 billion of which
is spent on hospital services
The evidence of market failure is abundant and the cost of these
market imperfections is large. However, unlike many industries anilyzed
by those who study industrial organization, market structure has little
to do with market failure. Instead, market failure in the hospital
markets is the result of behavioral characteristics and information
pr ob 1 ems
.
IV ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE EFFICIENCY
Attempts to regulate hospital efficiency pertinent to the therae cf
this paper began with the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 19 4 6
(H i 1 1 -Bur t on ) . The purpose of this bill was to provide grants and
subsidies to the states for new hospital construction and hospital
renovation Growth in hospital capacity was thought necessary to meet
increasing demands for hospital services resulting from population
growth, technological change in the treatment of health problems, and
public and private insurance. Federal programs to expand medical
education and, thus, the supply of physicians began in 1963. Both
programs were very successful in achieving their intended purposes
In the decades of the 1 9 6 ' s and 1970's, regulation turned to mora
direct control of hospital costs The Comprehensive Health Planning Act
of 1966 (CHP) was intended to fund state agencies to develop regional
facilities plans. CHP agencies were given little control over hospital
supply decisions except through their limited input on Hill-Burton or
Public Health Service funds The National Health Planning and Resource
Development Act of 1974 (HPRDA) established a number of health system
agencies (HSA) designed to halt the escalating costs of health care by
regulating hospital construction. The most significant feature of the
HPRDA is the requirement that states establish certificate of need (CON;
programs for expansion of bed space and other types of service where the
capital investment needed to offer those services is greater than a
threshold level These regulations have proven to be quite important in
the final outcomes of many hospital market configurations
Two effects can be expected from CON regulation First, CON
establishes a barrier to entry, protecting the status quo Thus, if
existing hospitals are inefficient, they will remain inefficient (Sloan
and Steinwald, 1980) Second, entry regulation into an industry that
does not have natural barriers to entry often leads to inefficient forms
of competition (Douglas and Miller, 1974) The airline industry
provides an example Prohibited from price competition and protected
from entry, the airlines turned to quality competition by increasing the
frequency of flights, the size of aircraft, and in-flight amenities
The result was substantial excess capacity and higher costs per
passenger Analysis of the effects of CON on hospital costs provide
results ranging from no evidence of reduced capital expenditures (Watts
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and Updegraff, 1975), reduced growth of licensed acute care beds but
increased growth of psychiatric, eit ended and special care beds
(Bicknell and Walsh, 1975), to reduced growth of hospital beds but
increased employees and auxiliary services per bed (Salkever and Bi:e,
1975 )
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO's) were
established in 1972 to serve as watchdogs over Medicare performance
PSRO's reviewed Medicare patient bills to eliminate services that
deviate from accepted norms, namely, that have greater social costs than
benefits However, these systems failed, largely because of the
difficulty in developing generally accepted measures of social benefits
and costs The PSRO's then reverted to the use of industry norms
However, industry norms provided inefficient guidelines because the data
used to establish the norms were taken from a period when providers had
little or no incentives to operate efficiently (Zeckhauser and Zook,
1981; Sloan and Steinwald, 1980).
In the late 1970's and early 1980's numerous state governments in
addition to the Federal government turned to various cost caps and the
Medicare section 223 limits of the Social Security Act Amendments of
1972 These limits pertained to total reimbursements related to daily
service charges However, these limits were not inclusive of high
technology ancillary services. The result was a pattern of cost
shifting from covered services to other services and from Medicare and
Medicaid patients to private pay patients (Meyer, 1983).
Since 1969, eight states have instituted mandatory hospital rate
regulations, Rhode Island has a cooperative program, and four additional
states have mandatory advisory hospital rate review programs (Joskow,
1981) These programs have followed a variety of regulatory schemes,
usually with some level of budget review. Many aspects of rate
regulation are similar to traditional utility regulation The limited
evidence that exists on the effectiveness of rate regulation is mixed
Joskow (1981), e.g., concludes that the rate of increase in total
hospital expenditures and expenditures per patient day were lower for
the regulated states than for a comparison group of unregulated states
This evidence is subject to criticism when analyzed on a state-by-state
basis Further, it suffers from a failure to take into account other
possible distortions caused by the regulation
There should be little surprise at the inadequacy of these
regulatory attempts to improve the efficiency of hospital markets when
one recalls the causes of market failure Evidence points to the fact
that the causes of market failure are behavioral and not structural
They result largely from a risk sharing system that provides improper
incentives for efficient production and consumption of health services,
and information imperfections None of these problems were addressed by
the various types of regulation summarized in this paper
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CHANGING THE MARKET INCENTIVES
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A variety of proposals have been made to eliminate the tax subsidy
responsible for excessive insurance coverage. Many also are concerned
with the low levels of copayraents and deductibles. The most extensive
plan, put forth by Enthoven (1978), would replace the current tax
exclusion of health insurance premiums with a fixed tax credit Aspects
of this plan are contained in a number of bills currently before
Congress. The intent of eliminating or placing a cap on the tax
exclusion is to provide consumers with a financial incentive to seek
efficient health care providers. Although the potential savings from
such action are great, the policy has not been implemented. Thus, no
empirical evidence exists to support these claims.
Actions have been taken in the public and private sect
more financial risk to producers and consumers in an effort
expenditures on health care There has been a significant
the level of deductibles and copayraents required by the hea
portion of many employee benefit plans A recent survey of
companies by Hewlitt Associates documents the extent of thi
deductibles and copayments The number of companies includ
deductibles in their employee health plans increased to 52
1984 from 17 percent in 1982, only 50 percent of the compan
full coverage of "room and board" costs in hospitals in 198
from 75 percent in 1983 Moreover, those providing full co
surgery declined to 27 percent in 1984 from 45 percent in 1
in Davis, et al, 1985). Phelps reported that the interim r
Rand Health Insurance Study provide evidence that a 25 perc
reduces utilization and expenditures by 20 percent (Phelps,
the results of the experiments analyzed by Phelps generaliz
broader population, substantial savings should be forthcomi
change
or to shift
to reduce
increase in
1th care
1200
s increase in
i ng
percent in
les provided
4, a decline
verage for
979 (Ci t ed
esu 1 t s of the
en t c opaymen t
1982 ) . If
e to the
ng f r om this
The actions on the part of payers to further utilize market
incentives to increase efficiency has led to the rapid development of
systems of prospectively determined rates for health care services
These have taken the form of prospective payment systems (PPS),
preferred provider arrangements (PPA), and complete prepayment plans
Each form of prospective payment shifts some of the financial risk to
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the provider and/or consumer The effects of these systems have led, in
turn, to increases in excess capacity and other pressures on health care
providers to supply health care services efficiently
The most prominent single PPS in the US is the Medicare PPS
enacted in 1982 that took effect in 1983 That system delineates units
of health care services into 468 diagnostic related groups (DRC's), each
of which represents an illness or health problem based on the patient's
primary diagnosis, secondary diagnosis, age, and sei Currently, costs
of physician services, ancillary services, outpatient services, and
capital costs are not included in the DRC's. Rates are determined by a
weighted average of historic costs of the hospital in question, other
hospitals in the region, and national hospital costs The hospital is
permitted to retain any surplus if costs are below DRG rates providing
an incentive for efficient production of hospital services. The hope is
that such a weighting scheme will reduce the in t
e
rhosp l t a I variance in
espenditures. pa Eventually, the hospital-specific and regional
weights are to be reduced with more weight being placed on national
averages
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The second problem is that the PPS does not reduce the incentive to
increase revenues by increasing hospital admissions Finally, where
secondary diagnoses are present, it may be possible for hospitals to
increase revenues by switching primary and secondary diagnoses in some
situations In this case, the PPS could actually lead to more
inefficiencies No systematic evidence has been found on the extent of
these problems with the actual PPS
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Karen Davis, et al (1985), provide a review of the evidence of the
effects of Medicare PPS on hospital utilization They compare pre and
post 1983 hospital utilization rates and costs However, the authors of
that paper preface their results with a very important caveat.
Specifically, hospital patient days for the elderly increased by an
average of 3.4 percent per year from 1975 to 1983, but declined by 8 7
percent from 1983 to 1984 with most of the reduction in patient days
resulting from reduced lengths of stay. However, over the same period,
patient days for the non elderly increased by 0.1 percent per year and
declined by 7 4 percent respectively, the latter decline being more
closely the result of reduced admissions.
Hospital cost increases follow a similar pattern. From 1975 to
1983, hospital costs increased at an average annual rate of 15.7 percent
compared to an increase of only 5.4 percent between 1983 and 1984.
(Davis, et al, 1985). Cost per patient day has increased by
appr oh ima t e I y the same amount throughout the entire period. Therefore,
the reduction in the rate of increase in hospital costs was the result
of fewer patient days, not reduced cost per patient day. (Davis, et al,
1985) .
As can be seen from these data, a substantial change occurred in
hospital utilization and cost between 1983 and 1984. The reason for the
caveat mentioned earlier regarding how much of the credit for this
change can be attributed to the Medicare PPS is that changes occurred
for non-Medicare as well as Medicare patients. In addition, the
Medicare PPS was phased in between October 1983 and September 1984 and
certain hospitals in certain states were eHempt Thus, only 25 percent
of Medicare payments to hospitals, or less than 5 percent of total
hospital reimbursements were based on the PPS. Finally, Davis, et al
(1985), indicate that many of the downward trends of hospital
utilization commenced prior to the inception of the PPS There is some
evidence that hospitals initiated programs to reduce utilization prior
to October, 1983, in anticipation of the Medicare PPS Needless to say,
the Medicare PPS has resulted in the appropriate incentives for
increased efficiency in the utilization of health care services. Our
ability to separate the quantitative influence of this system from other
factors must await the availability of more complete dita
A serious issue that remains to be resolved with the Medicare PPS
is the treatment of capital costs. Currently, capital costs are treated
as a pass through for which hospitals are reimbursed for actual capital
costs based on the proportion of patient days that are attributed to
Medicare patients The US Congress has set October 1, 1986, as a
deadline for resolving this issue A dispute between the Department of
Health and Human Services and the Office of Management and Budget
involves the appropriate levels of "add-ons" to DRG payments to cover
the capital costs and the appropriate treatment of fised capital in an
industry plagued with escess bed capacity. Senators Durenburger and
Quayle have introduced a bill that calls for a repeal of state health
planning and planning program review requirements and a flat percentage
add on to DRC's The add on would be phased in over six years with a
hospital weight that declines to zero by the sixth year Another bill
introduced by Senators Kennedy and Gephardt would provide a DRG-specific
add on adjusted for the capital intensity of each DRG, for regional
differences in construction costs, and with an exemption process for
hospitals for which capital payments were not sufficient to meet
principal, interest, and lease payments on projects undertaken prior to
year end 1985
Clearly, the treatment of capital costs will have a critical impact
on the effectiveness of the PPS as mechanism to provide efficient
capital decisions If the capital cost payment to hospitals is set too
low, it penalizes, possibly to the extent of exclusion from the market,
hospitals with high capital costs resulting from recent renovation
projects designed to increase efficiency and reduce costs while
protecting hospitals with older and possibly less efficient physical
plants An example might be a hospital that has expanded outpatient
surgery facilities Similarly, unreasonably low payments could
discourage other hospitals with older plants, and, therefore, low
capital costs, from undertaking capital improvement projects that would
increase efficiency, even if these hospitals have high occupancy levels
If the payments for capital costs are set too high, an Averch-
Johnson effect might result (Averch and Johnson, 1962). The Averch-
Johnson model, developed to analyze the nature of capital formation in
regulated public utilities, predicts that where the allowed rate of
return on capital is greater than the cost of capital, firms have an
incentive to over capitalize. Thus, excessive reimbursements for
capital could lead to inefficient expansion of capacity (in the case of
hospitals, a lack of contraction) in an industry already plagued by
excess capacity
The determination of the appropriate level of reimbursement for
capital costs has been avoided by public and private payers through the
use of selective direct contracting for services between the payer and
specific providers These arrangements, referred to as preferred
provider arrangements (PPA's), involve direct negotiation of rates
between the preferred provider organization (PPO) and the payer
(Trauner 1983) Hospitals are generally reimbursed on a discounted
basis of usual charges, with negotiated per diem rates or case rates
becoming more common Physicians may be paid at a discounted rate from
usual charges or on the basis of a negotiated fee schedule Discounts
range from 7 to 15 percent for hospitals and from 5 to 30 percent for
physicians (Gabel and Ermann, 1985)
PPO's have a number of advantages in addition to the determination
of the level of coverage of capital costs They provide appropriate
incentives on prices and inputs and contractual controls on the
production of priced services However, the units of priced services
may not be effectively controlled For example, if hospitalization is
priced on a per diem rate, the incentive exists for the PPA to
efficiently produce a per diem of hospital care, but no incentive exists
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to reduce admissions or lengths of stay of patients admitted
Therefore, to be effective, PPA's must contain stringent conditions for
utilization review, the cost of which must be weighed against the PPA
discounts .
Finally, PPA's provide a mechanism through which hea
providers can offer selective price discounts to attempt
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Probably the most widely publicized case of selective contracting
is the California Medicaid system, Medi-Cal. The Medi-Cal program was
authorized to accept bids from hospitals for the treatment of Medi-Cal
patients in 1982 California law was changed to provide for similar
contracting by private insurers and for contracting for physicians
services by public and private insurers in 1983. Selective contracting
was viewed by the Medi-Cal program as a substitute to HMO contracting
needed because of the shortage of available HMO's. Also, as a
substitute, the selective contracting provided a mechanism that was
reliant upon competitive incentives and the market system
Four important program policies were established by Medi-Cal that
facilitated the contracting: every accredited short-term acute care
hospital was invited to negotiate contracts; hospitals and Medi-Cal
worked from but were not limited to a "model" contract, payment was on a
fixed, per diem basis with only few exceptions, and there were direct
negotiations between one state negotiator and the hospital's
representative (Johns, 1985). By the end of 19 8 4, 68 percent of the
state's eligible hospitals had participated in contract negotiations and
70 percent of those had won contracts Ninety-two percent of the
state's historical expenditures for in-patient Medi-Cal services in
areas in which contracts existed were covered by negotiated contracts
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(Johns , 1985)
The effects of selective contracting by Medi-Cal are difficult to
assess at this time Total Medi-Cal savings in the 1983-84 fiscal year
were S70Q million The change in payment for in-patient care was
estimated to be responsible for $184 million, or 2 6 percent of this
total (Johns, 1985) However, caveats like those discussed above
concerning the Medicare PPS are in order because ceteris paribus
conditions did not hold for a number of other factors. Other states see
enough promise in this form of PPO to have initiated similar programs.
Other PPO's have grown rapidly Gabel and Ermann (1985) report on
surveys that reveal 33 PPO's in 1982 and 143 in 1984 Gabel (1985)
reported that PPO enrollments rose four-fold between December, 1984 and
May, 1985 to 5 8 million participants up from 13 million participants
Hospital and physician groups sponsored nearly one-half of the PPO's
with insurance carriers running closely behind (Gabel and Ermann, 1985)
The major weakness in PPO's reported by Gabel and Ermann (1985) was the
general lack of a rigorous utilization review. Thus, they predicted
continued growth in PPO's with increased emphasis by those organizations
on utilization review.
Health maintenance organizations (HMO's), the final form of
reimbursement mechanism to be discussed, have shown rapid growth as a
forn of prepaid health care HMO's provide one contracted source for
all health care needs of the consumer group for a specified premium
With revenues fixed in advance, HMO profits are maximized by minimizing
plan costs By providing comprehensive coverage of the health care
needs of the group, the problems of defining the limits of coverage are
eliminated Financial risks are passed on to the providers if they are
paid a per capita based on the number of enrollees in the HMO
Therefore, moral hazard generated by the incentives of providers to
prescribe excessive units of health services is eliminated
HMO's should be particularly effecti
delivery of health care services as press
efficient providers are increased In 19
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individuals who choose HMO's over traditional third party reimbursement
plans. However, Manning, et al (1984) found evidence that the Luft
results hold up under control for these factors
The increased risk borne by providers under prepaid plans is
generating structural changes among the traditional provider roles One
notable change is that providers, to minimize total health care costs,
are increasing their emphasis on "wellness" programs More
significantly, the structure of providers is changing in response to
competitive pressures. These structural changes involve simultaneous
moves in different directions all of which are efforts to provide
services more efficiently, respond to consumer tastes and utilities, and
maintain profitable levels of utilization.
Retrospective f ee-f or-ser v i ce reimbursement provided no incentive
for providers to promote outpatient surgery even when that was more
efficient and as efficacious as inpatient surgery Hospitals reimbursed
on a capitation basis or DRG rate have incentives to require outpatient
surgery when possible. This has led to an expansion of outpatient
surgery facilities by many hospitals Along with this development has
been an unbundling of hospital services resulting from the growth of
free standing surgicenters that offer one day treatment of many types of
outpatient surgery. There were 330 surgicenters in 1984 providing over
500,000 operations, compared to 212 centers in 1982 (Davis, et al,
1985) There has been a lower rate of growth in specialty ob-gyn
centers .
Similarly, on the physician's side, the number of emer g i cen t e r s
,
physicians offices that treat outpatients usually for minor problems and
are heavily oriented to service by maintaining long hours of operation
and convenient locations, have grown to 2,500 from 260 in 1931 (Davis,
et al, 1985). These facilities provide convenience to the patient and
permit the physician to capture revenues that otherwise would have gone
to the hospital
Hospitals have responded to this disintegration, or unbundling, of
hospital services by expanding their outpatient surgical facilities
and/or operating freestanding ambulatory care units. As reported
earlier, the American Hospital Association survey of Mu 1 t i hosp i t a 1
systems found that 55 percent of those systems operate ambulatory care
facilities Davis, et al (1985), reports that mu 1 t i hos p l t a 1 systems
operate 1,322 freestanding ambulatory care facilities of 1984
There is some concern that PPO's in certain circumstances could be
organized to be anticompetitive rather than pr ocompe t i t i ve (Feldstein,
1985) For example, assume that providers, such as hospitals, in the
same market area form a PPO Further, assume that these providers make
up a substantial share of the market, are permitted to collude with each
other in the prices to be charged by the PPO, are not permitted to offer
lower prices to alternative PPOs , and that the PPO has an exclusive
arrangement with the enrol lees . Under these very rigid circumstances it
may be possible for the providers to use the PPO to fix prices at
22
artificially high levels or to maintain prices by thwarting competition
However, more extensive information about market conditions is necessary
to turn this possibility into reality The Antitrust Division of the
U S Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have
indicated that they had no intent to challenge the PPO's that requested
an antitrust review in all but one case Thus, the preponderance of
PPO's are structured to increase competition in health care markets
Another structural change occurring as a result of competition in
health care markets, a type of horizontal integration, is the format To
n
of au 1 1 1 hosp i t a 1 systems either through mergers and acquisitions or
looser affiliations involving shared services The reasons for the
eitent of this activity was discussed earlier in this paper Many
health care planners predict that further horizontal expansion of
ma 1 t l hosp l t a 1 systems will diminish in the future However, the
expansion of physician group practices facilitated by single and
nu 1 t i hosp i t a 1 systems and in other cases independent from those systems,
and various types of vertical integration are occurring at a very rapid
pace
In 1980, 26 2 percent of the physicians in the U.S. were in 10,762
group practices The average group practice consisted of eight
physicians By 1984, 29.3 percent of the physicians were in group
practices with the average group sue increasing to nine physicians
(Arnould, Pollard, and Van Vorst, 1985) Clearly, most physician
service markets remain highly a
t
omi s t i ca 1 1 y structured with large
numbers of independent physicians.
Many of the older group practices formed under the umbrella of a
prepaid health plan or as tertiary care centers The Ka i ser -Pe rraenen t
e
Croup in California and Group Health of Washington, DC., are examples
of the former. Mayo Clinic, Virginia-Mason, and the Carle Clinic are
examples of the latter In recent years, many of the groups in the
latter category have vertically integrated into the insurance market by
offering HMO '
s
Group practices may result in economies of scale in the provision
of physicians' services, however, this is an area relatively untapped by
researchers More probable, if the group practice is integrated into an
HMO, economies of scale in the insurance function may dictate the size
of the patient base and thus the necessary size of the group practice
Group practices may also have lower contracting and other information
costs and superior internal mechanisms to control quality and enforce
utilization than IPA's and other contractual arrangements
Vertical integration also is occurring to provide an adequate
patient base and to control under one organizational unit all health
care costs and, therefore, all revenues Hospitals faced with declining
occupancy rates are forming physician group practices, as predicted by
the hospital models discussed earlier in this paper, to attract larger
patient bases Regional and tertiary care group practices are
diversifying into new geographic markets to expand their referral basis
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Ka l se r -Pe rraenen t e has physician staffs in 12 states and hospitals in 22
cities Mayo Clinic has announced plans to develop satellite facilities
to provide increased referrals to the Rochester campus More recently,
that clinic announced plans to acquire hospitals, the purpose being to
gain more control over hospital utilization, costs, and revenues
The smaller hospital and group practice will can be used to provide
anecdotal evidence of some of the types of integration occurring and the
strategic reasons for each type of integration. The for-profit clinic
is a tertiary care physician group practice made up of 135 physicians in
1981. The hospital was a not-for-profit 300 bed hospital at that time
Approximately 50 percent of the patient base of the organizations came
from within a 50 mile radius of the main campus A strategic analysis
of the market revealed that (1) there was a large surplus of hospital
beds in the market area and (2) as the supply of physician specialists
expanded the risk of relying on referrals to the main campus from
independent primary care physicians was increasing Thus, a goal was
established to expand the size of the self-contained patient base.
The first action of the organization was to establish a number of
primary care physician satellites within a 50- to 60-mile radius of the
main campus staffed by employed physicians who would refer patients
needing tertiary care to the main campus. Sin such satellites have been
established with more on the planning board
The nent action was to develop a wholly owned HMO to provide a
competitive alternative to other insurance plans and to "lock patients
in" to services offered by the organization. As a result of the
competitive nature of health care (smaller group practice and
independent physicians offered two alternative HMO choices to consumers)
and the general acceptance of the group practice mode of delivery in the
community, enrollment in HMO's rapidly grew to account for approximately
25 percent of health care services in the market
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health care facilities, negotiates PPA's with hospitals in locations
closer to the satellites than is the main campus hospital, is planning a
retirement center, and has developed a wholly owned malpractice
insurance company Throughout this same period, the organization has
moved from a low-keyed indirect marketing effort to an extensive
multimedia marketing effort with an extensive marketing department.
Many more recognizable national health care providers, such as
Hospital Corporation of America, Humana, Ka i se
r
-Permenen t e , could have
been used to provide this anecdotal evidence. The eKampIes would have
been similar but on differing scales of magnitude The selected
organization was chosen to provide evidence that structural change among
health providers is not limited to a small number of national
proprietary firms
The purpose of each of these types of integration is to reduce
costs and enhance the patient base and revenues Clearly, the incentive
for these changes has been brought about by changes in reimbursement
methods that place an increased risk of moral hazard on the producers
and consumers of health care services Simultaneously, these changes
are placing more reliance of competitive market forces to contain health
car costs. It is not obvious that complete vertical integration, i.e.,
the merger of one type of provider or service firm into another, will
always increase efficiency more than obtainable through alternative
contracting services However, it is clear that these structural
changes are altering traditional choice patterns between patients and
providers and among various provider types Empirical evidence of the
full extent and effects of integration is very limited eliminating the
opportunity to pass final judgement at this time. These and other
related questions about the effects of changes in health care markets on
market competition and efficiency are important topics for industrial
organization research
VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper was written with the intent of providing insight into
problems in the hospital sector by relying heavily on published research
viewed from the perspective of industrial organization. It is
abundantly clear from this review that the problems in the hospital
sector of concern to industrial organization economists are similar, if
not identical, to those of concern to economists in other subspecialties
such as labor, public finance, and applied microeconomic theory
Therefore, it would be presumptuous and egotistical to assert that the
relatively recent (with a few exceptions) interest of economists in the
field of industrial organization will bring dramatic new insights to
this area
One small, but very important, contribution to be made by
economists specializing in industrial organization is to stress the fact
that hospital services are bought and sold in markets The important
questions concern how efficiently the market is functioning, 1 e , are
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resources allocated efficiently, is market behavior competitive, and is
the result consistent with efficient market performance In other
words, research questions should address the causes and potential cures
of market failure.
Increased emphasis on government policies and private reimbursement
mechanisms to provide more reliance on appropriate market incentives by
altering the behavior of providers is a recent phenomena that has
emerged almost simultaneously with increased state regulation of
hospital rates Thus, it is difficult to empirically separate
influences on market performance of "deregulation" from those of
"r eregu 1 a t i on . " Changes in the tax system appear to have the most
promise of bringing about broad changes in the incentives of consumers.
However, short of those changes the private sector purchasers of health
care services already have made significant movements in the direction
of efficient management of the health benefits package provided to
employees, a movement placing pressures on providers to seek more
efficient delivery systems.
Future research should be directed to providing estimates of the
efficiency and effectiveness of new health care delivery configurations
This will involve filling in the gaps that exist in hospital cost
analyses, projecting appropriate product mixes for hospitals, analyzing
the role of proprietary hospitals, and the impact of those hospitals on
market performance. Can not-for-profit institutions function like
efficient for-profit institutions? Do economies of scale justify mu I t i
-
hospital systems' What effect will increased emphasis on competition
have on hospital-doctor relations and the objectives of hospitals? What
effect will increased price competition have on technological change?
Can a more price competitive health care system support medical
education? Underlying many of these issues is the very basic question
that asks "what is the nature of a sustainable price structure for
hospital services?" Will that price structure be supported by adequate
competition or are cost conditions such that monopolies will exist?
Information imperfections have been a significant cause of market
failure Numerous issues concerning the types and effects of
information on hospital markets remain unresolved (Pauly and Longwell,
1982) Also, if direct regulation is replaced by reliance on the
market, antitrust laws increase in importance as regulators of certain
types of market behavior (Freeh, 1984). Therefore, numerous research
questions arise surrounding the appropriate application of these laws to
correct problems of market behavior
Clearly, the problems and changes occurring in the health care
markets provide an almost endless list of theoretical and empirical
questions for the future
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TABLE 1
Changes in Numbers of Hospitals
1975-1983
Tota 1 For--Prof i t
Total Percent C ommun i t y Percent C ommun
i
ty Percent
Year Hospitals Change H osp i t a I s Change Hosp i t a Is Change
1975 7,156 * 5 , 875 * 775 *
1974 7
,
082 -1 5 , 857 -0. 3 752 -3
1977 7
,
099 2 5,881 0. 4 751 -0 1
1978 7,015 -12 5,851 -0. 5 732 -2 5
1 979 6
,
988 -0 4 5 , 842 -0 . 2 727 -0 7
1980 6,965 -0 3 5
, 830 -0 2 730 4
1981 6 , 933 -0 5 5,813 -0 . 3 729 -0. 1
1982 6,915 -0 .3 5,801 -0 . 2 748 2. 6
1983 6 , 838 -0 . 4 5, 783 -0 . 3 757 1 . 2
Source Hospital Statistics
,
American Hospital Association, 1934.
TABLE 2
C ommun i t y
Hospital Site Characteristics
1975-1983
Year Hosp i t a Is Beds
(000 's)
Beds /Hospi t a 1 Admissions
(000
' s)
1975 5,875 942 160 3 33 ,435
1976 5 ,857 956 163.2 33, 979
1977 5,881 969 164 . 8 34 , 273
1978 5,851 975 166.6 34 , 506
1979 5,842 984 168 4 35 ,099
1980 5
,
830 988 169.4 36,143
1981 5,813 1 ,003 172.5 36,438
1982 5,801 1,012 174 5 36 , 379
1983 5,783 1,018 176.0 36 , 152
6-24 Beds 224 4 . 3 19.2 129.7
25-49 986 36.5 37 1,156.0
50-99 1,414 102.9 72 8 3,392 4
100-199 1 , 382 195 . 3 141.3 6,942.0
200-299 726 175 3 241 .5 6,516.4
300-399 438 148 . 6 339 . 3 5,569.7
400-499 274 121.2 442 3 4,378.3
500 + 339 234 . 4 6914 8,067 3
Source: Hospital Statistics
,
American Hospital Association, 1984
NOTES
iThis paper ultimately turns to a discussion of the nature 3nd
causes of inefficiency in the health care sector These problems have
been the subject of an enormous number of research papers. In an
attempt to represent this research both fairly and within the confines
of a short article, we could not describe all of the research.
Therefore, we apologiie to those who may feel their research deserved
recogni t ion
2Unless otherwise cited, all data presented in this section are
referenced from Hos p 1 t a 1 Statistics , (Chicago: American
Hospital Association, 1984)
3O f these specialised hospitals, 85.1 percent have a capacity in
eEcess of 400 beds.
^Summary measures in this section were derived from data provided
by H E Freeh, University of California, Santa Barbara, using 1975
dat a
cJoskow used the Herfindahl index to describe market structure in
an earlier paper ( Joskow, 1980)
top n f 1 rms I f S
This index is the sum of S f or the
represents market share of firm i, the n-firm
concentration ratio is the sum of the S. f or the top n firms. The
Herfindahl index provides a more encompassing measure of market
structure than the 2 or 4 firm concentration ratio ( Schma
I
ensee , 1977).
However, these data were not available to the authors.
6 See Cowing et al (1983a) for a summary of these studies
7lnformation in the following paragraphs also comes from: Hospital
Statistics
,
(Chicago American Hospital Association, 1984).
gObviously, the validity of the cost functions discussed in the
previous section are circumspect if this has not been taken into account
in the estimation procedure (see Feldstein, 1974, and Cowing et al,
1983a)
CO
oTh 1 s is determined by a number of exogenous and endogenous
nd 1 t 1 ons
jnThe Blues were required to use community rating systems, in many
areas leaving room for the commercial plans to offer better rates to
certain groups within these areas
11A more complete discussion is found in Langwell and Moore, 1982;
Longwell et al, 1982, and Pauly, 1982
12See, "National Industry Council for HMO Development," Th_e
Heal t h maintenance Qrqanizat ion Ten Year Report 1973-1983
,
Tyashington
D C
,
1984)
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